Subtle changes in the boardroom

For the last twenty years, and without the public realising, the way in which boards of directors function has changed radically. As far as the structure of the board is concerned, we are a long way from the situation which Zola described in L'argent : the manager chose a few close friends and 'fourteen others who were less important, selected from among the most obedient and most decorative of shareholders', and where the auditors played a part which was 'as delicate as it was useless'. Independent administrators and auditors now play an active role in audit and compensation committees which may meet as often as ten times a year. They ensure that there are no regrettable incidents such as the latest ones which recently led to disaster. What is the new function of these boards and what are the consequences of this change in the governance of companies, and, in the near future, the governance of mutual insurance companies, and even co-operatives and associations ?